Previous literature on open source software (OSS) mostly analyzes organizational issues within communities of developers and users. This paper focuses on profit-oriented organizations that release software products under OSS licenses, and argues that variations in their endowments of intellectual property rights, namely patents and trademarks, help to determine which firms will tend to incorporate OSS into commercial products. We develop a theory to explain whether and under what conditions preexisting stocks of intellectual property rights can be useful complementary assets that allow firms to benefit directly or indirectly from commercializing OSS products, and test this theory on a novel dataset built on firms' announcements of OSS product releases in the specialized press during the period 1995-2003. We find that (a) firms with large stocks of software patents are more likely to release OSS products; (b) firms with large stocks of software trademarks are less likely to release OSS products; (c) firms with large stocks of hardware trademarks are more likely to release OSS products.
Introduction
Over the last decade, open source software (OSS) has reemerged as a mode for developing and organizing software innovation. The exchange of software codes among developers was the norm at the beginning of the computer industry, when much of the software was developed in-house by scientists and engineers of university departments and corporate research laboratories. But beginning in the late 1970s this practice slowly disappeared and proprietary software emerged as the dominant paradigm (Lerner and Tirole 2002) .
Nowadays, not only is OSS gaining strength as a development process, but it is also attracting increasing commercial interest among firms. The best-known examples are IBM, Sun Microsystems, and Oracle, all of which have started to invest in and legitimate the use of Linux for enterprise applications (Koenig 2004) . In the first quarter of 2005, Novell realized Linux-related product revenues of USD44 million, which accounted for 15% of its total sales in that period (eWeek 2005) .
Other firms, such as Red Hat, SCO Group, and Mozilla, have specialized as OSS distributors, aggregating, integrating, and optimizing the newest software codes available from the OSS community.
Why do some firms take more commercial actions involving OSS than others? Firms commercializing OSS products defy the traditional wisdom holding that a weak regime of appropriability seriously undermines firm incentives to release new products (Teece 1986 ). In fact, OSS characteristics contrast sharply with the standard model for proprietary software, whereby innovative firms conceal their source code and use licenses to deprive users of the ability to share and modify the original software (Dam 1995) . Instead, at the heart of any current OSS product there is a license that both waives the principal rights assigned to the software creator by copyright law and grants users the right to access, modify, and redistribute the source code (Lerner and Tirole 2005) . All types of OSS licenses make source code available, although they may differ in the restrictions imposed on modified works. At one end of the spectrum, copyleft licenses (for instance, the GNU General Public License, or GNU-GPL) force derived programs to be licensed under the same conditions. At the other extreme, non-copyleft licenses (for instance, the Berkley Software Distribution license, or BSD) impose no burden of reciprocity upon the licensee and hence may allow redistribution of derivative works under any license scheme (Lerner and Tirole 2005) . In any case, software code that is revealed as OSS becomes freely available, increasing the likelihood of imitation and substantially reducing the releasing firm's lead time and competitive advantage.
To be sure, firms can use different mechanisms to boost the appropriability of OSS products.
For example, they can combine an OSS with a proprietary license (Hecker 1999; Henkel 2006 ). Alternatively, they can employ traditional protection mechanisms such as legal rights and secrecy on at least part of the software, or build an exclusive relationship with a committed developer community (Dahlander and Manusson 2005) . On their part, as O'Mahony (2003) shows, OSS communities can prevent proprietary appropriation and protect their collective recognition and reputation through several techniques such as copyrights, brands, and logos. Finally, firms can resort to less restrictive OSS licenses (like the BSD) that do not prevent converting OSS into proprietary software.
These alternative protection mechanisms notwithstanding, it is indisputable that OSS significantly reduces the level of code secrecy compared to proprietary software. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the least protective among the OSS licenses (the GPL) is still currently the dominant scheme for releasing OSS (Lerner and Tirole 2005) . When a firm develops and sells OSS under the GPL, many of the above mentioned protection mechanisms are not available (Henkel 2006 ).
Our theoretical analysis starts from the premise that OSS can be interpreted as a newly emerging development process that hits the supply side of the software industry and induces firms to respond and adapt. In this new competitive scenario characterized by a sensible reduction of the level of protection of the core product, firms need to secure the control of other, possibly complementary, assets in order to benefit from their commercialization efforts (Teece 1986) . As a matter of fact, several scholars point out how preexisting assets, when protected and difficult to imitate, drive a firm's initial competitive position and affect its ability to adapt and exploit new opportunities (Trispas 1997; King and Tucci 2002) . Protected assets can be considered as nonsubstitutable and costly-toimitate resources (Barney 1991) , meaning that variations in such protected assets could explain a large part of the differences in OSS commercialization strategies across firms. Specifically, we focus on the stocks of patents and trademarks that firms have accumulated before commercializing their first OSS product, and we try to understand whether and why the endowments of these property rights are (or are not) complementary to the OSS, which is the intellectual property in need of protection.
In this context, we formulate the following three research hypotheses: (a) firms with large stocks of software patents are more likely to release OSS products; (b) firms with large stocks of software trademarks are less likely to release OSS products; (c) firms with large stocks of hardware trademarks are more likely to release OSS products.
We test these arguments by providing an extensive analysis of econometric data on the commercialization of OSS products by profit-oriented firms. Our sample, built upon the announcements of product introductions in the specialized press, tracks down all OSS product releases by firms from 1995 to 2003 in the two major software niches: operating systems and applications. This represents a novel dataset that is both systematic and comprehensive. We employ a count data model on the number of OSS product releases to test our hypotheses. Empirical results are broadly consistent with our predictions.
There is a fairly recent, but growing literature on OSS. Previous academic research in organization and economics focuses mainly on understanding the motivations behind the participation of individual agents within the collective development process, their overall incentive structure, the allocation of rewards within OSS projects, and the sustainability of such a model for innovation (von Hippel and von Krogh 2003; Shah 2006; Roberts, Hann, and Slaughter 2006; Mahony and Ferraro 2006; Gambardella and Hall 2006) . In fact, OSS has been traditionally considered a bottom-up movement, where most of the significant activity takes place within internet-based communities of independent developers who collaborate with each other in developing software that they, or their organizations, need. As a consequence, both the theory and the empirical evidence on firms' commercialization of OSS products are scant. Von Hippel and von Krogh (2003) argue that the free disclosure of source code limits "direct" paths to profiting from OSS products for commercial firms.
However, they recognize that firms may still find "indirect" ways of appropriating the returns from investments in OSS. For example, firms may benefit from patronizing OSS programs if these complement proprietary software or hardware that they already sell. Other authors emphasize that appropriability might not be firms' main concern if network externalities are important. In fact, OSS could increase the speed of diffusion of a given platform, and firms could then benefit by exploiting products that are complementary to that standard. Recent research based on survey data provides empirical evidence on the latter point (Henkel 2006; Gruber and Henkel 2006; Bonaccorsi et al. 2006) .
We contribute to this literature first by offering, to the best of our knowledge, the most comprehensive data on commercialization patterns in OSS, and second by providing a framework for understanding whether preexisting stocks of intellectual property rights can be useful complementary assets that allow firms to benefit directly or indirectly from using OSS code in commercial products.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the theoretical framework on which our main hypotheses are based. Section 3 describes the data and the construction of the sample, the empirical methodology, and the variables used in our estimations. Section 4 shows our results, and Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the implications of our findings, some possible avenues for future research, and some of the limitations of our work.
Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
Our premise is that preexisting assets affect the direction as well as the pace of a firm's adaptation (Trispas 1997; King and Tucci 2002) . Broadly conceived, OSS can be represented as a shock that hits the supply side of the industry and forces firms to respond. Thus, following the resource-based theory tradition, we investigate how heterogeneity in preexisting resource endowments among firms leads to variations in their response to a changing environment (Barney 1991) -in this case, differences in their efforts to commercialize OSS products.
We argued in the introduction that a salient difference between the OSS paradigm and the proprietary software paradigm is the level of protection of intellectual property, which is relatively lower in the former. In fact, under the OSS paradigm, protection of software products through source code secrecy is seriously undermined.
As the seminal work of David Teece has envisaged, when legal protection of intellectual property is weak, firms must rely on the control of complementary assets to profit from their product innovation efforts (Teece 1986 ). To confer an advantage, such assets must be difficult for potential competitors to replicate. That is, even if the new product is easy to imitate, the bundle made up of the new product and the complementary assets must not be. The protected intellectual property that a firm has accumulated before the advent of the OSS paradigm satisfies this condition, since it is by definition not easily imitable. Specifically, we focus on patents and trademarks.
Patents are legal titles granting the owners the exclusive right to make commercial use of their innovation and the enforcement power to prevent others from using it or to set the terms on which it can be exploited. Firms file patents to secure legal protection of their inventions-for instance, a new product-although patents also serve other purposes like blocking rivals' research, preventing suits, reinforcing bargaining power in cross-licensing negotiations, sustaining technology transactions, etc. (Cohen et al. 2000; Ziedonis 2004 ). In the software industry, usually a patent protects an algorithm, that is, a series of step-by-step procedures that are necessary to perform a task. If there are mathematical procedures beyond the algorithm, they are protected too. Although software patents were granted in the US before 1994, only after that date, thanks to a court decision, did software inventions become patentable per se and not only in conjunction with hardware inventions, so that any real difference between the treatment of software and that of other inventions was essentially eliminated by the US Patent and Trademark Office. The number of software patent applications increased dramatically after 1994. This has generated a very intense debate between detractors and advocates of software patentability (see, for instance, Hall and MacGarvie 2006) . This debate is out of the scope of this paper; for our argument, the key factor is that firms differ in their stocks of software patents before they make inroads into commercializing OSS products.
Trademarks are combinations of "words, phrases, symbols or designs that identify and distinguish the source of the goods or services" (USPTO Documentation, http://tess.uspto.gov). Firms can register as a trademark a new name, a jingle or a slogan, a new image, or a logo (e.g., "don't leave home without it"). Firms file trademarks to secure legal protection of their investment in marketing, reputation for quality, brand names, and distribution channels. Even if trademarks do not protect against the imitation of the product per se, they do help to boost appropriability by securing control of these complementary assets.
Trademarks can protect not only the name and the logo of a product, but also promotions. Trademark owners pay different types of fees for each class of goods/services for which a trademark is registered, and they have to prove periodically that they are using the trademark in the relevant market; even if the owner is willing to pay the fees, a trademark is cancelled if it is not commercially used for five consecutive years after registration. Whereas patents have received great attention in both management and economics literature, academic interest in trademarks has only recently emerged. Previous studies show that trademarks represent a good proxy for the products/markets in which a firm operates, and that they are correlated with sales and stock market value (Seethamraju 2003; Smith and Parr 2000) . Interviews that we conducted with four managers of software firms reveal that-given the continuous competitive pressure to release new productstrademarks are normally used to protect every single version of software.
Below we explore how preexisting stocks of patents and trademarks affect efforts at commercializing OSS products. Since such protected intellectual property has been accumulated under the proprietary software paradigm, it is not a priori clear that it can be leveraged into the OSS paradigm. In fact, these assets are the result of several factors, such as initial endowments, organizational learning, and path dependence, that are mostly exogenous to the new conditions (Dosi 1988 ). Hence, preexisting assets could be complementary and thus drive a favorable initial competitive position for the firm, or they could be antonymous and seriously undermine the efficacy of adaptation (i.e., by generating organizational rigidities, as in Gatignon et al. 2002) .
Software Patents
We highlight three reasons that help explain why a large portfolio of software patents can be a complementary asset that favors the commercialization of OSS products.
The first one is defensive. When a firm releases an OSS product that bundles several, sometimes dispersed, contributions, it is likely at risk of infringing some patents held by other entities.
However, the wider is a firm's patent portfolio, the stronger is its bargaining power, and the higher its chance to avoid litigation or establish friendly agreements with potential litigators. For example, in semiconductors, Hall and Ziedonis (2001) and Ziedonis (2004) show that when the markets for technologies are fragmented, large patent portfolios help firms lower transaction costs and resolve hold-up problems through the use of cross-licensing agreements.
The second reason is more strategic and relates to the possibility of controlling the development of an OSS project. Mann (2006) highlights how firms with software patents can direct the evolution of an OSS standard in two ways. First, they can make it prohibitively difficult for new contributors to obtain new patent rights that could spin off from the project. Second, they can discourage those contributions that pursue a deployment of the project that is too distant from the aims of the firm. For example, in workstations, Sun Microsystems controls the evolution of the Solaris open platform, building around it a dense fence of patented technologies. Greater control over an OSS project enhances appropriability and thus the incentives to commercialize OSS products.
The third reason is the potential complementarity between patented software and OSS products. Arora (1995) demonstrates that firms can still extract rents from the transfer of know-how that is easily imitable-avoiding moral hazard and transaction cost problems-provided that such know-how is bundled with complementary knowledge that is well protected. Therefore, firms with large repositories of patented software algorithms have more chances to extract rents from OSS products by controlling complementary assets (Teece 1986) . As a matter of fact, some firms enclose in the transaction the payment of a royalty over the patented technology together with the services sold on top of the OSS product. A classical example is Squeezebox, an MP3 player. The server software that controls the device is released under the common OSS GPL license. However, it is necessary to have a series of extra codecs installed in order to play back most audio formats; these are patent protected and therefore not included in the standard installation (Personal Computer World 2006) . Thus, our first hypothesis reads as follows:
HYPOTHESIS 1: The larger its preexisting stock of software patents, the more likely a firm will build OSS into its commercial software products.
Software Trademarks
Firms with large stocks of software trademarks have invested heavily to protect their marketing efforts, brands, reputation for quality, and distribution channels. This investment is tailored to the proprietary software paradigm, and we argue below that it cannot be leveraged into OSS.
First, as Mitchell and Singh (1992) have argued, the fear of product cannibalization prevents firms from investing in emerging and new markets. Typically, profits from new products are uncertain, and a firm is relatively unwilling to jeopardize existing, stable income streams by making risky investments (Conner 1998) . The industrial organization tradition predicts that an incumbent has fewer incentives to introduce new products because they erode profits in existing lines of business (Reiganum 1981) . A firm that has established and protected a reputation in proprietary software has done so to increase the consumer's willingness to pay a premium for quality, reliability, and brand name, and it therefore has an interest in emphasizing the costs of switching brands. OSS requires a quite different positioning, and straddling the two positions might end up cannibalizing investment in proprietary software brand names and reputation (Chaudhuri and Holbrook 2001) . Thus, firms with large software trademark portfolios will be more likely to adopt wait-and-see strategies.
To be sure, a strong brand name or reputation for quality can be an intangible asset that is not easily imitable and is exploitable in other domains. Thus, software trademarks could be complementary to OSS products and could boost their appropriability, much as patents do. However, the investment in marketing, brands, and reputation for quality is not easily transferable to OSS because the vendor channels and the types of customers are different. OSS products tend to be downloaded directly by customers or uploaded by producers (Entrepreneur 2002) . This feature makes it more difficult for firms with large stakes in proprietary software to adjust their sales channels, which are typically based on networks of distributors, and therefore leverage their existing stock of trademarks. Von Hippel and von Krogh (2003) discuss how OSS users are intrinsically different from the traditional customers of proprietary software: OSS buyers are more sophisticated and demand less standardized products-products that come with the option for the user to fix problems and bugs directly, without any external assistance from postsale services. More in general, the literature has highlighted how firms usually focus on and invest in satisfying established customers in existing markets to whom they have already made strategic commitments (Ghemawat 1991; Christensen 1997; Tripsas 1997) . We can then state our second hypothesis:
The larger its preexisting stock of software trademarks, the less likely a firm will build OSS into its commercial software products.
Hardware Trademarks
Although proprietary software and OSS can, broadly speaking, be considered as alternatives, either open source or proprietary software is complementary to the hardware, that is, the machine on which the software runs. If hardware and software are characterized collectively as a value chain, then commoditizing those portions of the chain in which the company does not have a core competence helps earn higher returns from those portions of the chain in which it can compete. Thus, firms that have invested heavily in establishing a brand name and reputation for quality in hardware will benefit if OSS either reduces software production costs (in case the firm typically develops in-house the software for its machines) or minimizes hold-up from software suppliers (in case the firm typically outsources software production).
Indeed, the costs of assembling an OSS product are much lower than those of developing new software from scratch (Samuelson 2006) . Firms can combine various available OSS modules at only a fraction of the cost of developing ex-novo equivalent proprietary modules (Economist 2005) . Von Krogh et al. (2005) find software reuse quite common among 15 OSS projects; Spaeth et al. (2006) show that in the OSS Debian project, software reuse follows a power law distribution, with some software chunks intensively reused. In addition, OSS opens up the opportunity to reduce the bargaining power of specialized suppliers of proprietary software by offering a cheaper and more customizable alternative to their products. Firms with large stocks of hardware trademarks have therefore an incentive to back OSS initiatives from which they will eventually benefit as a result of complementarity. Industry jargon refers to this as "patronizing strategy."
It is also worth noting that firms with strong brand name and reputation in hardware care less about protecting their software. First, if software is simply used to make hardware machines operative, such firms prefer OSS because by making the source code public they are relieved of the burden of servicing and updating the software. Second, if the final package embeds customized software programs within hardware solutions, the bundle as a whole is much more difficult to replicate because it increases the level of tacit and nonobservable knowledge (Henkel 2006 ).
These arguments lead to our third hypothesis.
HYPOTHESIS 3:
The larger its preexisting stock of hardware trademarks, the more likely a firm will build OSS into its commercial software products.
Data and Methodology Sample Construction
Our sample is composed of all the firms that announced, through the specialized press, the introduction of a software package based on an OSS license between 1980 and 2003. We select our data from the databases Infotrac's General Business File ASAP and PROMT, by searching for press articles that report a "product announcement," a "new software release," or a "software evaluation" in the software sector (SIC Code 7372) and that contain in their text the words "open source" or "Linux."
1 After checking carefully that only OSS products are being selected, we extract from each 1 These press announcements provide a measure of firm efforts at commercializing OSS products.
They do not allow us to distinguish between investments in simply assembling the product and article the name of the company and the date of product introduction (month and year). We find that the first commercial announcement of an OSS product was in May 1995. We cannot directly measure the level of "vaporware" in our product introduction notifications-a well-known limitation in news event data-but we believe that the high integrity of the journals from which the announcements are collected limits the likelihood of its presence in our data (eWeek, Computer Reseller News, Electronic Engineering Times, and PC Magazine account for more than 70% of the announcements). In addition, 65% of the selected articles also contain a product evaluation, which implies that the journal's reviewer has, at least, seen the product prototype. As is shown in our robustness checks below, focusing only on these articles does not qualitatively change our findings. We do not have precise information about the type of license that is used for each product. However, we can identify all products that are Linux-based. Such products are licensed under the GNU-GPL scheme, which imposes the burden of reciprocity, i.e., the source code of derived work must be made available to all receivers of the software. Notice that these products represent more than 80% of our whole sample of commercially released OSS products. We will take this feature into consideration below when we perform some robustness checks.
Using the SIC codes reported in the articles, we divide the OSS products into two main niches: operating systems, "OPSYS" (SIC Codes 737261 and 737250), and applications, "APP" (6 digit SIC Codes beginning with 7372, other than -61 and -50). When the SIC code is not available at 6 digits, we analyze the text of the article to distinguish between the two niches. The literature provides evidence of potential differences between these niches in the factors that drive product releases and determine their success. For operating systems these factors are the strength of network externalities and their performance on hardware; for applications, they are the features of the products, the marketing approach, and the speed of customer learning-by-using (Torrisi 1998) . Moreover, earlier studies of the software industry (Gandal et al. 1999 ) demonstrate that the diffusion of an operating system paradigm investments in developing it; however, this distinction does not represent a serious concern for the arguments proposed in our hypotheses.
is intrinsically associated with the availability of a large portfolio of applications that could be run on that software base.
We check for the group structure of our firms by using information from the Business and
Company Resource Center database, Gale Group's Infotrac. We end up with 213 different entries in APP, which account for 360 different products, and 320 entries in OPSYS, which account for 877 products. Since 72 firms entered both niches, the total number of entrants in the OSS market is 461.
All company data used in our analysis are obtained from Bureau van Dijk's databases Icarus, Amadeus, and Jade for American, European, and Asian firms respectively. Table 1 shows the distribution and average size of the firms in our sample by core sector of activity. Notice that 85% of the firms that introduced OSS products in OPSYS (and 86% of those that introduced OSS products in APP) are either software or hardware firms, and that these firms account for 88% of OSS product releases in OPSYS (and 89% in APP).
[ 
Estimation Procedure
We estimate a count data model where the dependent variable is the number of new OSS products (or new versions of already launched OSS products) announced by a firm from the date of its first OSS product release until December 2003. We believe this variable captures well the efforts a firm makes to build OSS into its commercial software products. Moreover, the literature has suggested that in a system with free disclosure of technical knowledge, such as OSS, firms must continually introduce new products or new updated versions in order to survive and gain a competitive advantage (Garud and Kumaraswamy 1993) . Table 2 shows the distribution of the number of OSS product introductions along with the average presence of a firm in the market (in months) for groups of firms classified by the number of products they introduced. 36% of the firms in OPSYS and 21% of the firms in APP released more than one product before December 2003. Most of the multirelease firms introduced on average one product per year. Among firms with more than one release, 17.3% of those in OPSYS released between 2 and 12, and 22.2% of those in APP released between 2 and 6. It is worth noticing that the majority of firms-those that had introduced only one product-were late entrants in the market (about 3 years of presence on average in both niches). Accordingly, as we report in the control variables section, we introduce into our estimations a firm's duration of presence in the OSS market.
[ We hypothesize that the number of OSS product releases is generated by the function ( )
, where y is product count, x is the set of explanatory variables, and β is a vector of parameters to be estimated. One econometric challenge resides in the fact that our sample is not randomly selected, because we observe only those firms that have introduced at least one OSS product during the period under scrutiny. Thus, we cannot directly employ the Poisson (or Negative Binomial) model for count data, and we need to run an estimation procedure that incorporates the correction for the no-release observations. We therefore use a procedure based on that of Terza (1998) , who shows how the number of product introductions conditional on a selection equation can be estimated by nonlinear least squares, even if the actual conditional distribution is unknown.
Consequently, we build a sample of firms that did not release OSS products during the period under study. These firms are randomly selected using as matching criteria the precise country (Japan, Germany, UK, Canada, and so on) and sector (3 digit SIC code) composition of the original sample, so that the total dimension of the original sample is replicated for the no-release sample in both APP and OPSYS. We again use the databases Icarus, Amadeus, and Jade to select these firms.
Considering both the firms in the original sample and the no-release firms, we assume that the The estimation procedure is then run in two steps, where the former models a sample selection equation and the latter models the mean of the number of product introductions conditional on at least one product introduction. We address the first-step estimation through a Probit specification, where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if a firm has introduced an OSS product and 0 otherwise
Given the first-step estimation of the parameters α, the mean of the number of product introductions conditional on a product release (
) can be specified as (Terza 1998) [ ] 
Main Independent Variables: Patents and Trademarks
Software Patents. We count the number of unexpired software patents granted to a given firm up to the month of the announcement of its first OSS product. We download patents data from the USPTO database available at http://tess.uspto.gov. In order to distinguish software patents from other patents, we apply search algorithms to the front page of the patent (see the Appendix for a detailed explanation of these search algorithms). We label this variable PATENTSOFTWARE.
3
Software and Hardware Trademarks. Like patents records, trademarks data are downloaded from the USPTO database available at http://tess.uspto.gov. In order to distinguish between software and hardware trademarks, we apply to the front page of the trademark search algorithms analogous to those applied to patents (see the Appendix). We then create two variables: TRADEMARKSOFTWARE and TRADEMARKHARDWARE, the preentry number of live USPTO trademarks in software and in hardware filed by a firm up to the month before its first OSS product announcement.
Below, we analyze in more detail the distribution of patents and trademarks within our sample and, most importantly, how they relate to each other. The message we want to convey is that the stocks of trademarks and patents measure two different aspects of a firm's preentry position, and that firms display important heterogeneity in these two dimensions. Thus, it is not uncommon that a firm with a large stock of software trademarks has only few software patents granted by the USPTO or vice versa. For example, Oracle, Cisco Systems, and Computer Associates have trademark-patent ratios of 2, 3, and 27 respectively. Conversely, IBM's patent-trademark ratio is approximately 6.
3 As we discussed above, the number of software patent applications increased dramatically after 1994, when a court decision made software patentable per se and not only in conjunction with hardware inventions. For the purposes of our analysis, this does not represent a drawback, for two reasons. First, it is obviously not a concern for younger firms born under the new patent regime. Second, as Bessen and Hunt (2004) show, the bulk of patent activity in software is due to large and established manufacturing firms. It is very likely, therefore, that in the years after 1994 these firms were trying to quickly patent accumulated stocks of knowledge that they wanted to protect. Differences in firms' propensities towards patents and trademarks are already visible at the sector level. Table 3 reports the means of the number of hardware and software trademarks, and of the number of software patents, for the sample firms in three broad sectors: hardware and semiconductors, software, and electronics and telecommunications. We also report the ratios between the pairwise means of patents and trademarks. The descriptive statistics show that hardware and semiconductor firms have a higher propensity to patent software than to file software trademarks. On the contrary, software firms show a higher propensity to file software trademarks than to patent.
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]

Controls
We include a set of controls in our estimations. First, we control for firm size and age, where SIZE is measured as the number of employees in the year of the announcement of the first OSS product and age is proxied by three period dummies that are equal to 1 if the founding year of a firm is between 1976 and 1985 (AGE76-85), between 1986 and 1994 (AGE86-94), and after 1995 (AGE95).
The baseline is a firm founded before 1976. These time breaks broadly correspond to the main development eras in the computer industry (workstation, personal computer, open source software).
Size and age are standard controls in the entry and survival literature, and can be interpreted as proxies for a firm's scale and experience. In addition, we control for the degree of firm diversification in the year of the announcement of the first OSS product (DIVERSIFICATION). We measure it by a Herfindahl 4 If we focus on the firms in the upper tail of the distribution (firms with more trademarks or patents) by considering the value of the mean plus the standard deviation (Table 3 in Second, we add a firm's stock of hardware-related patents granted at the USPTO up to the month before its first OSS product announcement to measure the extent of its protected knowledge base in computer hardware, server, motherboard, and network technology (PATENTHARDWARE). This variable is meant to control for the presence of complementarities between protected knowledge base in other ICT components and OSS. However, it is also plausible that firms with greater technological specialization in hardware components show less interest in releasing software products in general and OSS products in particular.
Third, given that we run separate estimations for the two niches (APP and OPSYS), and 72 firms have announced product introductions in both of them, we control for the fact that firms that have already entered one niche may have a significantly different number of OSS releases in the other.
Therefore, when we run our estimations for OPSYS, we introduce a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a firm has introduced a software application before (and not after) its first operating system introduction, and zero otherwise (ANTEAPPLICATION). Similarly, in the estimations for APP niche, we create the dummy variable ANTEOPSYSTEM, which is equal to 1 if a firm has introduced an operating system product before (and not after) its first introduction of an application. The relevance of these control dummies is suggested by previous studies that find positive and strong feedbacks between applications and operating systems. Comparing DOS and CP/M products, Gandal et al. (1999) highlight, for instance, that applications make operating systems more valuable and vice-versa. These findings suggest that a firm that has entered into both niches could benefit from some sort of advantage in releasing new software products.
Fourth, a potential concern about the use of stocks of patents and trademarks is that there is significant heterogeneity in patent and trademark propensity across different sectors, as our analysis in Table 3 has also pointed out. Software firms, for instance, have traditionally patented less than other firms, partly because software per se could not be patented before 1994. Thus, our core variables might capture a sector effect rather than a firm effect. We take this into account by introducing five Finally, since firms announced their first OSS product at different times and we observed their product introductions only until December 2003, it is important to control for a firm's duration of presence in the market (Hardin and Hilbe 2001) . We therefore build the variable TIMEEXPOSURE, defined as the number of months elapsed between a firm's first OSS product introduction and the end of the period (December 2003). We insert the log of this variable in the second step estimation with the coefficient constrained to 1. This is equivalent to adding a multiplicative factor TE i to the Table 4 provides the basic descriptive statistics for the independent variables and controls.
[ Table 5 shows the results of the second-step, nonlinear least squares estimation, that is, the effect of our variables on the number of OSS product introductions. We discuss, first, the effect of a firm's preexisting trademarks and patents on the number of product introductions in OPSYS. Next, we show that some differences are observed in APP, and we propose a tentative explanation for this finding.
Results
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
A firm's larger stock of preexisting software patents enhances the number of OSS product releases. Thus, as our first hypothesis conjectured, software patents are complementary assets whose control increases the appropriability of OSS products (Arora 1995) . This finding also suggests that software patents can be used as bargaining chips to reduce potential hold-up problems and/or allow the firm to better control the evolution of an OSS project (Ziedonis 2004; Mann 2006) . Thus, software patents, which may represent intellectual property protection on other products or protection of components of a product also containing some OSS code, are playing an important role even within the OSS paradigm. Holding all other variables at their mean value, our estimated model predicts that doubling the number of software patents with respect to the mean of PATENTSOFTWARE would increase the number of OSS product introductions by 49%.
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In line with our second hypothesis, the larger the number of software trademarks, the lower the expected number of OSS product introductions in OPSYS. Thus, the threat of cannibalization plays an important role for those firms that have invested heavily in proprietary software brand name and reputation for quality. Holding all other variables at their mean value, doubling the number of software trademarks with respect to the mean of TRADEMARKSOFTWARE would reduce the number of OSS product introductions by 10%.
Finally, the number of hardware trademarks shows a positive and significant effect on the number of product introductions in OPSYS. This finding indicates that there are complementarities between hardware and software, and that firms that have invested in establishing a brand name and reputation in hardware can benefit from commoditizing the software counterpart. Keeping all other variables at their mean value, doubling the number of hardware trademarks with respect to the mean of TRADEMARKHARDWARE would increase the number of OSS product introductions by 17%. This finding lends support to our hypothesis 3. 6 5 Since we are estimating a count model, this means specifically that doubling the number of software patents with respect to the mean would imply a predicted change in the number of OSS product introductions from 1.89 to 2.83. 6 These counterfactual increases in the core independent variables represent quite conventional means to measure their size-effect on the dependent variable according to the estimation model. They are meant to give a broad idea of the results of an experiment that might be unfeasible in reality, given the The results are quite similar for APP, except for the estimate of the effect of hardware trademarks, which is now not significant, although it still shows the expected sign. This finding is consistent with the fact that applications need fewer linkages and synergies with hardware.
Of particular interest in this niche is the positive and highly significant coefficient of the control variable ANTEOPSYSTEM, which suggests that a key driver for the number of applications released is whether or not a firm has previously launched an operating system. We interpret this finding as evidence of the patronizing strategy that some firms pursue: by backing OSS applications, firms increase the value of OSS operating systems. This picture is indeed consistent with the initial stage of the OSS market, where-lacking an established and reliable set of application producersfirms that want to launch operating systems are in some way "forced" to release in-house applications in order to increase the value and legitimacy of their OSS operating systems.
As far as the other control variables are concerned, SIZE has a positive coefficient, implying that effects of scale are also important in OSS. Age dummies do not show significance, suggesting that experience plays a limited role. Interestingly enough, DIVERSIFICATION is negative and significant in all regressions. So, in accord with consolidated evidence in the literature, the preexisting level of diversification spurs entry into new environments (Pavitt 1998) . Finally, the negative effects of PATENTHARDWARE-significant only for the operating systems niche, and not significant in many of the robustness checks we describe below-does not support the conjecture that legal protection of ICT-related hardware components helps to boost the appropriability of OSS products. Firms with strong technological specialization in hardware might have fewer incentives to invest in software products due for instance to fundamental differences in programming languages between hardware and software engineers. nature of firm resources (Barney 1991) . It is important to notice that our independent variables show high standard deviations within our sample.
Robustness Checks
We perform various robustness checks to validate our findings. The results of these alternative regressions are shown in Table 6 . First, to ensure that our results are robust regardless of the type of license scheme, we run the regression only with product introductions that are Linux-based (Model 1 in Table 6 ). OSS products can be licensed under different schemes that allow for different levels of "openness" of the code. The Linux-based products are all licensed under the same GNU-GPL scheme, which imposes the burden of reciprocity. As we mentioned above, these products represent 87% and 88% of our sample of OSS product introductions in OPSYS and APP respectively. Second, we perform the regression with only those product announcements (about 65% of our whole sample) that come from articles containing a product evaluation, which implies that the journal's reviewer has, at least, seen the product prototype. This is likely to reduce the problem of "vaporware" we mentioned above (Model 2 in Table 6 ). Finally, to test for multicollinearity biases, we exclude sequentially our core independent variables from the estimation (Models 3, 4, and 5 in Table 6 ). The estimated coefficients remain fairly stable in all these robustness checks.
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
We also performed the following unreported robustness checks, which are available upon request: (1) we used age as a continuous variable; (2) we ran our regressions only for US firms, since trademark and patent variables are drawn from the US Patent Office and therefore they are measured more precisely for this subset of firms; (3) we pooled together all product releases regardless of the niche to which they belonged; (4) we scaled patent and trademark counts directly by size; (5) we ran the regressions excluding the 3 largest firms to check whether our findings might be driven by outliers.
In all these cases, results remained broadly consistent.
Discussion and Conclusions
Until recently, the OSS movement has been championed by individuals, mostly software engineers and developers, with little firm participation. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that firms have now started to take an increasing commercial interest in OSS opportunities. This paper accomplishes two goals. First, it provides novel and comprehensive data on the commercialization of OSS products.
Second, it identifies some sources of heterogeneity in OSS product introductions across firms:
variations in preexisting stocks of intellectual property rights, namely patents and trademarks, help explain why some firms are taking more commercial actions within the OSS paradigm than others. We have confirmed our hypotheses for a dataset built on firms' announcements of OSS product releases in the specialized press during the period 1995-2003. Three results are worth summarizing. First, we find that patents play an important role in appropriating the returns from the commercialization of OSS products. Thus, firms with large stocks of software patents introduce more OSS products. As Ziedonis (2004) suggests, patents may serve as bargaining chips. Thus, firms with large patent portfolios fear less the threat of litigation in case their OSS products infringe rivals' patents. Arora (1995) suggests that patents are useful to protect unpatentable knowledge if there are complementaries between the two knowledge components. Therefore, firms may leverage their stock of patents to protect complementary OSS products.
Our second finding points to the potential cannibalization threat that OSS products exert on proprietary software products. Firms with a large portfolio of software trademarks fear the devaluation of their brand name and reputation for quality if they straddle to OSS. This result is consistent with a consolidated literature in management and economics that argues that incumbent firms have fewer incentives to introduce new products (Ghemawat 1991; Christensen 1997; Tripsas 1997) .
Interestingly, this finding also confirms the serious potential threat that the OSS movement exerts on consolidated leaders in the software industry.
Our third finding reinforces the idea that complementarities are a key factor when appropriability conditions are weakened (Teece 1986) . In fact, we show that firms with large stocks of hardware trademarks would benefit from OSS because it commoditizes those portions of the value chain in which they do not have a competitive advantage. We have argued that OSS both reduces software production costs and minimizes hold-up from software suppliers. Thus, firms with a brand name and reputation for quality in hardware would gain by backing OSS initiatives, the so-called patronizing strategy.
Our findings generate some important implications for software managers and practitioners.
First of all, OSS moves the core of appropriability from code secrecy to the legal protection of a software technology, i.e., the protection of an algorithm. Consequently, the technology core of a software product will be less dependent on the code writing ability that makes an algorithm executable, and more dependent on owning and protecting the algorithm that accomplishes a task "best." This has important implications for firms that aim to exploit OSS opportunities, since they might need important investments in patent protection as well. Especially, small and young firms with scant legal protection experience could be placed at a disadvantage if they do not quickly realize the importance of formally protecting their core technologies.
Mixing open source approaches with proprietary assets and investments is the way for firms to profit from commercializing OSS. This could be important not only for large incumbents, but also for entrepreneurial firms (see Gruber and Henkel 2006) . A good example of this approach is provided by Clareos. Clareos is a software company founded in 2000, with headquarters in Virginia. Its best known product, CrossCut, is an open source comprehensive enterprise platform for on-demand analysis of multi-terabyte datasets. The product has been proved to be 7-10 faster than any other solution on the market. Given the open architecture, CrossCut is highly customizable with the ability to integrate existing analytical applications, report tools or portals to develop new analytical enterprise applications. The product is based on an algorithm that is protected through the US patent 6879984.
Thus, the presence of a patented complementary piece of intellectual property enhances the appropriability of the OSS solution without altering its customizability (Business Wire 2006). Finally, our results highlight some implications for the evolution of the value chain between software and hardware if OSS continues to gain importance. Indeed, if quickly riding the gravy train is the straightforward conclusion for hardware vendors, our suggestion to specialized software suppliers is to shift their investments towards novel selling channels, new relationships with customers, and different marketing approaches according to the growth of OSS markets.
It goes without saying that there are many important aspects of OSS commercialization that we were unable to uncover in this paper. One interesting research question that we did not analyze for lack of data is how firms use different strategies to limit the amount of source code revealed in their OSS products. In fact, the degree of openness would be an important piece of information to elucidate how firms profit from OSS products. Nor did we have extensive information about the type of license under which the software product was sold (although we have identified a subset of products all licensed under GNU-GPL). Such information could cast new light on firm business model and commercialization strategies. Another intriguing research question concerns the degree of direct participation of firm employees in the OSS community, and the extent to which firms hire people from the OSS community. This analysis would help to better define the interactions between firms and the OSS community of users, practitioners, and developers (Lerner and Tirole 2005) . Moreover, it would be helpful to understand how firms resolve organizational challenges that arise from coordinating commercial needs with the philosophy of the OSS community-specifically, how firms coordinate and motivate OSS contributors across multiple teams, establishing realistic goals and deadlines. These, we believe, are all potential avenues for future research. (♦) Dummy variables (a) Time of exposure is defined as the number of months that elapsed between firm entry (first OSS product release) and the end of the period (December 2003) . It is used as a multiplicative factor to the conditional mean for the second step estimations, i.e., it is used in log with the coefficient constrained to 1.
(b) The significant estimate for the covariance term θ in the Applications niche reflects the presence of unobserved factors that are common to the two decisions of a firm (whether to enter the OSS market and how many products to launch). Its negative sign shows that the average number of product introductions would have been overestimated without a control for selectivity. 
